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ANGER AND THE UNITY OF PHILOSOPHY: 
INTERLOCKING DISCOURSES OF NATURAL AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY 





By exploring various theoretical discourses of anger in Enlightenment Scotland I intend to 
show that various branches of philosophy exploited the same conceptual resources while 
discussing phenomenon in natural, moral and religious contexts. Relying on the same 
concepts, various branches of theoretical inquiry were intertwined so that different layers of 
discourse exerted a mutual influence on one another: physiological discourses were filled 
with hidden moral meaning and religious content, and vice versa. Therefore, the discourses of 
the natural, psychological, social and transcendent aspects of human beings exhibited a 
remarkable conceptual unity in this period, just before they started to develop into specialized 
fields of knowledge. The present paper offers a case study as to how these conceptual 
interconnections worked within the Scottish Enlightenment’s sphere of intellectual influence 




Anger is at the forefront of theoretical interest in eighteenth-century natural and moral inquiry 
in Scotland:1 it serves as a standard illustration in the medical, moral and theological 
                                                
1  It is also in the forefront of interest in the Enlightenment in general. For a discussion of the developments 
on the Continent, one however that leaves out the physiological context, see Coleman P., Anger, Gratitude, 
and the Enlightenment Writer (Oxford: 2011). However, the Scottish context deserves special attention, 
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discussions of fevers and violent active passions. As such it receives acute attention in 
connection with various physiological phenomena, like e.g. circulation, the animal spirits and 
raging fevers. In the descriptive and explanatory “science of man”, which can be understood 
as a middle-range theory mediating between physiological and normative (ethical and 
theological) considerations, anger is discussed in connection with benevolence, love, and 
other passions motivating actions, tempers and various appetites, as well as its role in art and 
poetry. In ethical contexts it is discussed, in a typically condemning manner, as a moral fault, 
in the context of corrupting the mind; and in theological contexts, it is considered as a passion 
demolishing humility. But sometimes it is also painted with more appealing colours as a state 
of mind necessary for the exercise of certain social virtues and self-preservation. 
In this paper I will argue that these discourses of the Scottish Enlightenment are not 
independent of one another, quite to the contrary: various moral and natural philosophical 
discourses penetrate each other, linking moral philosophies to then-contemporary medical 
theories, and vice versa, lending medical theories moral and theological significance. 
Therefore the discourses of anger in this period are eminently suitable to illustrate the thesis 
that there is an intimate and remarkable connection between the discourses of natural and 
moral philosophy in the period.  
This thesis has significance in the context of present-day historiographies of both 
science and philosophy that are still inclined to treat their canon separately.2 By exploring the 
                                                                                                                                                   
because as Coleman (ibidem 4n7) points out ‘we do not find French equivalents to Hume’s or Smith’s 
reflective analysis of particular passions as part of an overall moral philosophy’. 
2  Although there is a tendency to merge the canons: notable examples include Janiak A., Newton as 
Philosopher (Cambridge: 2008), Garber D., Leibniz: Body, Substance, Monad (Oxford: 2009), Janiak A. – 
Schliesser E. (eds.), Interpreting Newton (Cambridge: 2012), and Biener Z. – Schliesser E. (eds.), Newton 
and Empiricism (Oxford: 2014). For a recent discussion of the problem see Schmaltz T.M., “What Has 
History of Science to Do with History of Philosophy”, in Lærke M. – Smith J.E.H. – Schliesser E. (eds.), 
Philosophy and Its History: Aims and Methods in the Study of Early Modern Philosophy (Oxford: 2013) 
301–323. 
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interconnections of various discourses of anger, I wish to illustrate by a case study the 
fundamental unity of natural and moral philosophies in the early modern period. As I will 
argue, the discourses of anger in these different fields are conceptually congruent and these 
discourses frequently merge in a rather intricate manner: physiological theories are influenced 
by implicit normative and religious motivations, the phenomenological psychology of the 
“science of man” is informed by physiological considerations and also by implicit normative 
agendas. 
 
Visions of disciplinary unity and interaction 
 
Ever since C.P. Snow’s famous essay on the ‘Two Cultures’ (1959), it has become a 
commonplace to refer to the divide separating the sciences and the humanities.3 This divide 
did not exist for those working on the questions of anger in various discourses of the Scottish 
Enlightenment. Instead, the participants saw themselves as contributing to a joint enterprise 
that could potentially converge upon a unified account of human phenomena encompassing 
physiological, moral and theological approaches. While the unifying character of this 
enterprise was considered as a matter of course, philosophy was not preoccupied with 
reconciling the ‘scientific’ and the ‘manifest’ image of man, as Wilfrid Sellars’ happy phrase 
has it,4 but aspired to a comprehensive explanatory understanding of human beings from their 
natural, cognitive and affective constitution to their moral and transcendent ends.  
 Early modern philosophers formulated various visions of the unity of philosophy. At 
one end of the early modern epistemological spectrum, Descartes’s influential vision of the 
sciences, in his Principles of Philosophy (1644), as branches growing out of metaphysical 
                                                
3  Snow C.P., The Two Cultures (Cambridge: 1993). 
4  Sellars W., “Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man”, in idem, Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind 
(London: 1963) 1–40. 
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foundations represents one version of how unity could be conceived. Descartes’s original 
vision of method that underpinned this unity prescribed starting from intuitively clear and 
infallibly known metaphysical principles, the world’s basic constituents, ‘simple natures’, 
through which deductive knowledge in physics and other fields of knowledge was attainable.5 
At the other end of the spectrum, David Hume’s foundational project in his Treatise of 
Human Nature (1739/40) aspired to empirical knowledge about the limits and prospects of 
human cognition, a basis upon which a ‘compleat system of the sciences’ could be erected.6 
 In late seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century Scotland the unity of the sciences 
was typically conceived of in a Newtonian framework that postulated the primacy of 
experimental natural philosophy. Following the summary of his method of analysis and 
synthesis in Query 31 of the Opticks (which first appeared in the 1706 Latin edition), Newton 
formulated his legacy for moral philosophy in a much-quoted sentence: ‘if natural Philosophy 
in all its Parts, by pursuing this Method, shall at length be perfected, the Bounds of Moral 
Philosophy will also be enlarged.’7 According to Newton, this enlargement should proceed 
through the perfection of natural philosophy, which consists in its increasing contribution to 
our knowledge of the attributes and intentions of God: 
 
For so far as we can know by natural philosophy what is the first cause, what power he 
has over us, and what benefits we receive from him, so far our duty towards him, as 
well as that towards one another, will appear to us by the light of nature.8 
                                                
5  On Descartes’s vision of method see Garber D., “Descartes and Method in 1637”, in idem, Descartes 
Embodied (Cambridge: 2000) 33–51. 
6  On Hume’s foundational project see especially Hazony Y., “Newtonian Explanatory Reduction and Hume’s 
System of the Sciences”, in Biener Z. – Schliesser E. (eds.), Newton and Empiricism (Oxford: 2014) 138–
170 and Boehm M., “Hume’s Foundational Project in the Treatise”, European Journal of Philosophy 
(2013) doi: 10.1111/ejop.12056. 
7  Newton Isaac, Philosophical Writings (Cambridge: 2004) 140. 
8  Ibidem. 
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This self-understanding of natural philosophy was quite unlike that of modern science: it did 
not aspire exclusively to a descriptive, explanatory and secular knowledge of nature, but it 
also had intrinsic moral and theological content and implications.9 
 For Newton, the derivation of moral and theological knowledge from knowledge of 
nature was possible because the laws of morality, unlike the laws of nature, did not depend on 
God’s volition. As Peter Harrison puts it, for Newton God ‘wills good things – [and] things 
are not good because God wills them’.10 As Newton himself says, God is ‘freely willing good 
things […] and constantly cooperating with all things according to accurate laws, as being the 
foundation and cause of the whole of nature, except where it is good to act otherwise.’11 
Therefore, not the presupposition of God’s inexplicable will, but his goodness should be our 
guide in understanding nature. Newton’s inquiry is all about God’s creation: it is an inquiry 
by which we find out about his intentions and thus about our own duty. Through the analysis 
of phenomena we find the laws of physics, and as these laws reflect God’s will and God wills 
good things, a fortiori, the laws of physics must concur in the production of good effects. 
 Newton did not take decisive steps toward the fulfilment of his vision for disciplinary 
unity, but he clearly formulated the task and the framework for Newtonian philosophers: to 
refine moral philosophy within the methodological and theological framework that his natural 
philosophy had set. And this was a persistent heritage for Scottish natural and moral 
philosophers: most of them were willing with David Fordyce to ‘[c]onsider nature or the 
                                                
9  Cunningham A., “How the Principia Got Its Name; Or, Taking Natural Philosophy Seriously”, History of 
Science 29 (1991) 377–392, here 388. For a discussion see Grant A., “God and Natural Philosophy: The 
Late Middle Ages and Sir Isaac Newton”, Early Science and Medicine 5 (2000) 279–298. 
10  Harrison P., “Was Newton a Voluntarist?” in Force J.E. – Hutton S. (eds.), Newton and Newtonianism 
(Dordrecht: 2004) 39–64, 43. For a discussion of Harrison’s ideas see Henry J., “Voluntarist Theology at 
the Origins of Modern Science: A Response to Peter Harrison”, History of Science 54 (2009) 79–113. 
11  Cited in McGuire J.E., “Force, Active Principles, and Newton’s Invisible Realm”, in idem, Tradition and 
Innovation: Newton’s Metaphysics of Nature (Dordrecht: 2004) 216. 
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World as the Volume or Book of God in the meanest page of which his perfections are 
legible’.12 Having been committed to this understanding of the world, Colin Maclaurin in his 
influential mid-century introductory text to the ideas of Newton’s Principia (1748) also 
insisted on the representation of natural philosophy as an enterprise ‘subservient to purposes 
of a higher kind, and is chiefly to be valued as it lays a sure foundation for natural religion 
and moral philosophy’.13 The elaboration of the implications, as well as the critique, of 
Newton’s programme for moral philosophy was left to the next generations, and many 
Scottish moral philosophers were willing to take up the Newtonian torch.14 
One of the most self-conscious Newtonians, George Turnbull, in his Principles of 
Moral and Christian Philosophy, published in two volumes in 1739/40, makes an attempt to 
set the principles on the basis of which moral philosophy can be made out to be continuous 
with the programme of Query 31.15 Turnbull’s central idea is this: regular and orderly 
appearances are due to the fact that nature is governed by laws whose physical explanation is 
given if an effect is shown to be arising from those laws. Some of these laws are such that 
they produce ‘good, perfection and beauty’ in the material world,16 and an effect is thus 
instantly accounted for morally once it is shown to be produced by such laws. Explaining 
phenomena in this way is the part of natural philosophy that can be called moral philosophy. 
Just as Newton envisaged, the perfection of this part can proceed only through the refinement 
of natural philosophy, and our knowledge of the final causes that it provides. Probably writing 
under the influence of Colin Maclaurin, Turnbull proclaims that 
                                                
12  Fordyce David, “A Brief Account of the Nature, Progress, and Origin of Philosophy” [1743/44], in idem, 
The Elements of Moral Philosophy (Indianapolis: 2003) 200. 
13  Maclaurin Colin, An Account of Sir Isaac Newton’s Philosophical Discoveries (London, J. Nourse [etc.]: 
1775 [1748]) 3. 
14  For a discussion see Demeter T., “Enlarging the Bounds of Moral Philosophy: Newton’s Method and 
Hume’s Science of Man”, in Biener Z. – Schliesser E., Newton and Empiricism (Oxford: 2014) 171–204. 
15  Turnbull George, The Principles of Moral and Christian Philosophy (Indianapolis: 2005) 1:48–50. 
16  Ibidem. 
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all the conclusions in natural philosophy, concerning the order, beauty, and perfection 
of the material world, belong properly to moral philosophy; being inferences that 
respect the contriver, maker, and governor of the world, and other moral beings 
capable of understanding its wise, good and beautiful administration, and of being 
variously affected by its laws and connexions. In reality, when natural philosophy is 
carried so far as to reduce phenomena to good general laws, it becomes moral 
philosophy; and when it stops short of this chief end of all enquiries into the sensible 
or material world, which is, to be satisfied with regard to the wisdom of its structure 
and oeconomy; it hardly deserves the name of philosophy in the sense of Socrates, 
Plato, Lord Verulam, Boyle, Newton, and the other best moral or natural 
philosophers.17 
 
Thus moral philosophy begins where the conclusions of natural philosophy are reached. The 
conclusions themselves are already part of moral philosophy, because they are related to the 
order (beauty, good, and perfection) of the material world. Precisely for this reason they have 
constitutive reference to moral laws, just as they are bearers of theological content with 
respect to the design and government of the universe. 
The unity of various branches of philosophy so conceived amounts to more than a 
mere congruence of vague methodological pronouncements: it arises from the very nature of 
the subject matter common to these branches. As Turnbull himself puts it, unity arises from 
‘the nature of things’ as the material world had been created purposively ‘for the sake of the 
moral world’, so that they ‘make one strictly, connected system’.18 On the basis of this view 
of the world Turnbull even goes almost as far as endorsing a view akin to Berkeley’s idealism 
                                                
17  Turnbull, Principles 1: 52–53. 
18  Turnbull, Principles 1: 440. 
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when he says that the material world ‘considered apart from its effects upon perceptive 
beings, hath no existence’ – and he only slightly qualifies this strong metaphysical 
commitment by adding the proviso that ‘at least, [it] cannot be said to merit existence’.19 
There is thus a constitutive reference of the material world to the world of perceptive and 
moral beings, a reference without which the material world cannot be accounted for. 
It is thus not a bottom-up unity that Turnbull envisages for philosophical disciplines 
that is secured by the foundational disciplines of natural philosophy. Instead, in his vision, 
natural, moral and religious insights have a mutual reliance on one another: the study of the 
natural world presupposes perceptual and psychological capacities that can be studied both as 
phenomena of physiology and as distinctively human phenomena of a ‘science of man’. The 
unity and mutual dependence of these aspects of the world as studied in natural, moral and 
theological branches of philosophy are underpinned by the fact that the world is fit for 
purpose – that it is adapted to a certain end. 
This teleological unity of the world is also reflected in Francis Hutcheson’s 1742 
lectures on moral philosophy that prescribe search for the purposes in our constitution for 
which God and nature ‘has formed us’.20 Hutcheson also finds a motivation for natural 
philosophy in studying what ‘these things are which our natural senses {or perceptive 
powers} recommend to us’, and his vision of unity is consonant with Turnbull’s. And so is 
Fordyce’s influential The Elements of Moral Philosophy (1754) in which he introduces 
philosophy as a descriptive enterprise that aspires to the knowledge of things ‘whether natural 
or artificial, by observing its Structure, the Parts of which it consists, their Connection and 
joint Action’. This descriptive knowledge of the ‘Constituent Principles’ that things follow in 
                                                
19  Turnbull, Principles 1: 441 
20  Hutcheson Francis, Philosophiae Moralis Institutio Compendiaria with A Short Introduction to Moral 
Philosophy (Indianapolis: 2007) 24. 
 9 
the course of their normal functioning directly leads to knowledge of their ‘Office and Use’, 
which in turn leads to knowledge of the ‘common Effort or Tendency of the Whole’.21 
Thus the dominant vision concerning the unity of philosophy conceives the union of 
various branches of knowledge against the background of final causes with theological and 
normative aspirations. In this context David Hume’s account of human nature is outstanding 
because his vision of unity avoids theological aspirations altogether, and aims primarily at a 
secular and explanatory ‘science of man’. For Hume, the unity of philosophy is conceived 
primarily by the means of method, and not against the background of final causes or 
teleological considerations.22 Yet, for the world of living organisms he retains some of the 
rhetoric of the mutual dependence of parts for a common purpose,23 and due to his 
commitment to the methods of anatomy while exploring human nature,24 this functionalistic 
and synoptic outlook is characteristic of his account.25 
The resulting knowledge of the anatomy of human nature is largely independent of its 
actual physiological realisation, but physiology is not irrelevant to reaching conclusions in the 
science of man: lessons from optics, for example, can be useful in exploring sensation, a 
faculty whose study belongs equally to moral and natural philosophy.26 Hume also turns to a 
physiological explanation of mistakes in reasoning couched in terms of animal spirits, and 
argues from the analogies between human and animal anatomy and physiology towards the 
                                                
21  Fordyce David, The Elements of Moral Philosophy (Indianapolis: 2003) 6. 
22  See Schliesser E., “Hume’s Attack on Newton’s Philosophy”, Enlightenment and Dissent 25 (2009) 167–
203, and Demeter T., “Hume’s Experimental Method”, British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20 
(2012) 577–599. 
23  Hume David, A Treatise of Human Nature (Oxford: 2007) 1.4.6.12. 
24  Ibidem, 2.1.12.2. 
25  For a discussion see Demeter T., “The Anatomy and Physiology of Mind: David Hume’s Vitalistic 
Account”, in Horstmanshoff H.F.J. – King H. – Zittel C. (eds.), Blood, Sweat and Tears: Changing 
Concepts of Physiology from Antiquity into Early Modern Europe (Leiden: 2012) 217–240. 
26  See e.g. Hume, Treatise 2.2.8.6. and 1.9.3.11. See also 2.1.1.2 where Hume proclaims that the task of his 
science of man with respect to sensation ends where the task of anatomy and natural philosophy begins. 
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conclusion that the mental capacities of animals must be similar to those of humans, and they 
are different mostly in degree and not in kind.27 These conclusions allow for drawing further 
conclusions about what is good or useful for this particular constitution called human nature, 
and this can result in normative considerations on how to act in various situations, or how to 
change the circumstances so as to ensure the desirable action of those involved in a given 
situation.28 But it certainly does not allow for? drawing conclusions concerning the nature or 
intentions of the deity.29 
The unity of philosophical inquiry was just as popular an idea among natural 
philosophers and physiologists as it was with moral philosophers. As part of a wider 
European tendency,30 vitalistic ideas increasingly populated various branches of natural 
philosophy in Scotland from the early decades of the eighteenth century. As a consequence 
the sharp distinction that mechanical philosophies had drawn between mind and matter was 
blurred,31 a development that could provide further support for the thesis that various 
branches of philosophy are united by the intricate connections among their respective subject 
matters. It is in this context that John Gregory could conclude in 1770 that ‘[t]he laws of 
union between the mind and body, and the mutual influence they have upon one another […] 
                                                
27  Hume, Treatise 1.2.5.20 and Hume David, An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (Oxford: 2000) 
9.1. 
28  See Demeter T., “Morals before Objectivity: On the Relation of Moral Cognition and Moral Philosophy in 
Hume”, in Traninger A. – Murphy K. (eds.), The Emergence of Impartiality (Leiden: 2014) 335–359. 
29  This is the lesson of Hume, Enquiry, Section 8/2, and Section 11. 
30  See Reill P.H., Vitalizing Nature in the Enlightenment (Berkeley: 2005). See also the useful collection 
Wolfe C.T. (ed.), Special Issue: Vitalism without Metaphysics? Medical Vitalism in the Enlightenment. 
Science in Context 21 (2008). 
31  See Wright J.P., “Substance versus Function Dualism in Eighteenth-Century Medicine”, in Wright J.P. – 
Potter P. (eds.), Psyche and Soma: Physicians and Metaphysicians on the Mind-Body Problem from 
Antiquity to Enlightenment (Oxford: 2002) 237–254. 
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is one of the most important enquiries that ever engaged the attention of mankind, and almost 
equally necessary in the sciences of morals and of medicine.’32 
The search for the laws of psychophysical unity connected the field of human 
physiology to morals and religion. In very much the same manner as Maclaurin understood 
natural philosophy as being subservient to purposes of a higher kind, George Cheyne, the 
fashionable Scottish doctor, proclaimed in 1724 that ‘[t]he infinitely wise author of nature has 
so contrived things that the most remarkable rule of preserving life and health are moral 
duties commanded us, so true it is, that “Godliness has the promises of this life, as well as that 
to come.”’33 Thus conceived, medical research contributes to fulfilling our moral duty and 
transcendent aspirations by preserving our health in accordance with God’s commandments, 
and it also helps us understand the world better by explaining what our creator has actually 
intended to us. 
The interconnections among various branches of philosophy are thus not ensured by 
one-way influences, but rather, as most authors emphasize, they constitute a system of mutual 
dependencies. Irrespective of the widespread reference to a theological framework, the central 
point of these visions, as is commonly acknowledged by natural and moral philosophers, is an 
aspiration to knowledge of ‘the nature, laws & connections of things, […] & from thence 
deduce rules for the conduct & improvement of human life’34 – that is a comprehensive 
account of the world of dead and living matter, of morals and, for most philosophers, of God. 
The aim is thus a coherent account of the world, where coherence is not primarily a logical 
property of theories. Instead, it is used in the context of terms like “connection” and “order”, 
the bestowing of which upon the variety of things being the main task of philosophy. This is, 
                                                
32  Gregory John, “Observations on the Duties and Offices of a Physician, and on the Method of Prosecuting 
Enquiries in Philosophy”, in idem, John Gregory’s Writings on Medical Ethics and Philosophy of Medicine 
(Dordrecht: 1998) 128. 
33  Cheyne George, A Treatise on Health and Long Life (London, William Kidd: 1787) 4. 
34  Fordyce, “A Brief Account” 166. 
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as Adam Smith puts it, ‘the science of the connecting principles of nature’. Philosophy is 
responsible for ‘representing the invisible chains which bind together all these disjointed 
objects, endeavours to introduce order into this chaos of jarring and discordant 
appearances’.35 The success of this enterprise is partly measured by the coherence various 
theories forge in a world of disordered phenomena.  
Let us now turn to the question of how the coherence of the natural, moral and divine 
world is established when inquiry is conducted with the acute awareness of the relevance of 
one discipline to the larger scheme of the sciences. 
 
Anger as a disease of body, mind and society 
 
Anger is probably ideal for the illustration of how a phenomenon can travel through various 
disciplines and find its way into various descriptive and normative discourses, at the same 
time revealing a remarkable unity among them. Physiology and the “science of man”, 
understood as a theory of the mind and society of moral beings, aspire to a descriptive and 
explanatory account of what anger consists in and how it is situated among other phenomena 
of the human condition. In normative moral and theological contexts, the questions concern 
the moral standing and the proper attitude toward anger, and its place in God’s creation. 
These discourses, as one might expect on the basis of what we have seen above, penetrate 
each other: prima facie descriptive discourses are filled with moral significance and 
theological connotations, and at the same physiological ideas also enter moral and religious 
contexts. 
 That physiology and descriptive psychology are mutually relevant was obvious to 
many, once vitalistic ideas concerning the union of mind and body became common currency. 
                                                
35  Smith Adam, “The History of Astronomy”, in idem, Essays on Philosophical Subjects (1795), ed. W.P.D. 
Wightman – J.C. Bryce (Indianapolis: 1982) 33–105, 45–46. 
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It was gradually acknowledged that living bodies should be studied differently from the non-
living parts of nature, because animal economy is not just mere mechanism, and living bodies 
are not Cartesian automata for which a iatromechanical outlook could be the proper approach 
and neither could the activity of human bodies be derived exclusively from some mental 
substance. It was increasingly acknowledged that ‘mechanism takes Place and operates in it 
self only, on dead Matter’.36 Thus it seemed natural to approach the activity of the mind as 
naturally combined with the internal activity of living matter, and to build theories of human 
functioning with the commitment that ‘the Works of Imagination and Memory, of Study, 
Thinking, and Reflecting, from whatever Source the Principle on which they depend springs, 
must necessarily require bodily Organs’.37 And vice versa: in order to understand phenomena 
of life, recourse must be taken to a ‘Self-active Principle’ to which bodily mechanism is 
subordinated in ‘organized bodies fit for Animation and living Functions’.38 The 
psychological discussion of cognitive functions was therefore underpinned by, and conjoined 
with, the physiological discussion of living functions, and eventually it would drive toward a 
unified account of mental and physiological aspects of human beings, and abandon the image 
of man advocated by substance dualists.39 
 This approach may have seemed even more appropriate? for affective functions and 
faculties, simply because more than cognitive faculties they were perceivably accompanied by 
bodily symptoms and processes. Anger is a phenomenon that aptly illustrates the mutual 
dependence of the affective and physiological realm because it has a place both in the 
physiological category of “raging fevers” and in the psychological category of “violent 
                                                
36  Cheyne George, The English Malady (London, G. Strahan: 1733) 94. 
37  Cheyne, The English Malady 53. 
38  Cheyne, The English Malady 95. This is an idea characteristic for Enlightenment vitalists, see Reill, 
Vitalizing 128–132, 148–154. 
39  See Wright, “Function versus Substance Dualism”. 
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passions”. From a physiological perspective, anger in its primary form was typically 
conceived as an acute disease. As Cheyne put it: 
 
Hatred, for example, anger and malice, are but degrees of a frenzy, and a frenzy is one 
kind of a raging fever. From all which it is plains the violent and sudden passions, are 
more dangerous to health, than the flow and Continued, as acute diseases are more 
destructive than chronical.40 
 
Anger is thus represented as a condition with destructive consequences for the human body. 
Thus if people are concerned about leading a healthy life, then excesses of passions should be 
avoided because these excesses are as dangerous to ‘the preservation of integrity of their 
intellectual faculties, or the bodily organs of them’ as are the ‘excesses in high food, or 
spirituous liquors’.41 
Cheyne had an explanation of the destructive consequences of anger primarily in 
terms of bending and stretching the nervous fibers, which violently speeds up the circulation 
of blood and bodily juices, and blocks secretion. This line was also followed several decades 
later by William Cullen when he proclaimed that ‘[a]mong the causes increasing the force of 
the Circulation, anger and other violent active passions are to be reckoned’,42 which is due to 
the influence of the brain’s energy upon the heart.43 This process can have potentially 
destructive consequences ‘in urging not only previous determinations with violence, but also 
in urging to excess inequalities, otherwise innocent.’44 The physiological consequences of 
anger can be so excessive that they constrain conscious agency by limiting ‘the power of 
                                                
40  Cheyne, Treatise 125. 
41  Cheyne, Treatise 124. 
42  Cullen William, Works of William Cullen, 2 vols. (Edinburgh: 1827) 2: 215. 
43  Ibidem 2: 366. 
44  Ibidem 2: 214. 
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reasoning or choosing means to ends’,45 but Cullen doubts that this disease typically entails a 
lasting or ‘desperate’ condition of the brain.46 
Richard Mead, who was not of Scottish origin but belonged to the sphere of Scottish 
intellectuals,47 devoted his Medica Sacra (published posthumously in 1755) to the 
enlightenment project of naturalizing the spiritual diseases as represented in the Bible. His 
central point is that ‘the divinity ought not to be made a party concerned in imposing diseases, 
which may possibly have natural causes’.48 He undertakes the task of ‘removing vulgar errors, 
especially those related to religion’49 by giving medical explanations and suggesting cures for 
Biblical diseases, most importantly for ‘daemoniacks’, i.e. demonic possession. According to 
Mead’s diagnosis, the symptoms associated with this condition are just those of madness, ‘a 
disease of an injured imagination, which derives its origin from the mind, having been too 
long a time fixed on any one object’.50 Anger, whose physiological description in Mead is 
also couched in terms of increased circulation,51 is a principal cause of madness, because as 
he says elsewhere, ‘inordinate affections, dwelling long on the mind, frequently become 
                                                
45  Ibidem 1: 107. 
46  Ibidem 1: 566–567. 
47  Mead studied medicine with Archibald Pitcairne in Leiden and belonged to the Pitcairne Circle which 
consisted mostly of Scottish medical men like George Cheyne, George Hepburn, and William Cockburn. 
Like many other members of the circle he wished to place medicine on Newtonian footing. Thus he easily 
fits with Scottish context. For further discussion see e.g. Guerrini A., “Tory Newtonians: Gregory, Pitcairne 
and Their Circule”, Journal of British Studies 25 (1986) 288–311; Brown T.M., “Medicine in the Shadow 
of the Principia”, Journal of the History of Ideas 48 (1987) 629–648. On the influence of Scottish medicine 
well beyond the borders of Scotland see Wild W. (ed.), Medicine-by-Post: The Changing Voice of Illness in 
Eighteenth-Century British Consultation Letters and Literature (Amsterdam: 2006). 
48  Mead Richard, “Medica Sacra”, in idem, The Medical Works of Richard Mead (Dublin, Thomas Ewing: 
1767) 475. 
49  Ibidem 444. 
50  Ibidem 471. 
51  See Mead Richard, “Mechanical Account of Poisons” in idem, The Medical Works of Richard Mead 
(Dublin, Thomas Ewing: 1767) 3–113, 52. This essay was written in 1702 under the influence of Pitcairne 
without much mathematics but under the ideology of turning medicine Newtonian. 
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tedious diseases’, which reflect their respective natures, and if untreated, ‘anger ends in fury 
and madness’.52 Thus anger comes in two forms, and for Mead, unlike for Cheyne, it is more 
dangerous in its chronic than its acute version because the former has a capacity to develop 
into a serious mental disorder. 
The typical tone in which moral philosophers discuss anger is in tune with the medical 
discourse in emphasizing its destructive consequences for body, mind and society. Turnbull 
concurs with the physiological discourses of anger when he describes it as a ‘boiling, 
scorching fever’.53 As such it is a source of misery of the body, and it also belongs to the 
group of ‘evil passions, which sadly degrade and corrupt the mind’.54 Thus anger is both a 
moral and a medical condition that cries for a cure. Hutcheson also agrees that these passions 
are ‘immediately uneasy and tormenting’, ‘we are the worse for them’,55 and therefore it is a 
duty towards ourselves to restrain these passions. 
Anger is also a disease of society, and not only of the individual mind and body. The 
anti-social consequences of anger and similar violent passions are at the forefront of 
theoretical interests on the threshold of the Scottish Enlightenment. Gershom Carmichael, 
accepting the Stoic understanding of anger as a ‘short insanity’, emphasizes that anger has the 
most ‘unsocial’ consequences, and recommends refraining from action ‘in a state of blazing’ 
and diligence in ‘restraining our anger’.56 Carmichael’s legacy is reflected in Hutcheson’s 
approach; he defines anger as a violent ‘Propensity to occasion Evil to another, arising upon 
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apprehension of an Injury done by him’.57 As such anger is essentially an anti-social, ‘Selfish 
Passion’, whose satisfaction yields ‘Pleasures opposite to those of the publick Sense’.58 Anger 
therefore drives us in the opposite direction than benevolence, which is for Hutcheson the 
central cohesive force of the social world analogous to Newton’s gravity in the natural 
world.59 Nevertheless, Hutcheson warns against taking the presence of such selfish passions 
as an indication that due to ‘the great and good’ God’s intentions ‘men have not been 
equipped by nature for social life’. Anger and related passions arise only in the context of 
‘conflict of interests, rivalry, jealousy, or by some thought of previous injury or cruelty,’ so 
albeit destructive of social bonds, these passions are only secondary to natural benevolence.60 
Because we are aware of its potentially destructive consequences, anger is thought to 
preclude a sympathetic response of bystanders. Although sympathy is a faculty of human 
nature that facilitates the communication of affections, it works in the reverse way with anger 
and the like passions precisely because they are anti-social. As Adam Smith explains in his 
Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759): 
 
The hoarse, boisterous, and discordant voice of anger […] inspires us with either fear 
or aversion. We do not fly towards it […]. It is the same case with hatred. Mere 
expressions of spite inspire it against nobody, but the man who uses them. Both these 
passions are by nature the objects of our aversion. Their disagreeable and boisterous 
appearance never excites, never prepares, and often disturbs, our sympathy.61 
                                                
57  Hutcheson Francis, An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections, with Illustrations 
on the Moral Sense (Indianapolis: 2002 [1728]) 58. 
58  Ibidem 31, 95. 
59  See Hutcheson Francis, An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue (Indianapolis: 2008 
[1725]) 150. 
60  Hutcheson Francis, “On the Natural Sociability of Mankind” [1730], in idem, Logic, Metaphysics, and the 
Natural Sociability of Mankind (Indianapolis: 2006) 209–210. 
61  Smith Adam, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (Cambridge: 2002) 45. 
 18 
 
For this reason the imitations of anger and similar passions can be very moderately exploited 
in artistic creation, as it could facilitate at most a ‘very strange entertainment’.62 Lord Kames 
explains the underlying mechanism in greater detail his Elements of Criticism (1762): 
imitations of anger are ‘so far from causing any emotion similar to themselves, to incite a 
spectator to imitation, that they have an opposite effect’ even if it is moderate.63 In Kames’s 
account this feature of anger arises from the fact that its expression puts the audience on the 
defensive, and therefore the one expressing anger invites a negative moral judgment: he is 
duly condemned for abandoning the standards of good taste and stepping outside the 
community of amiable men – a social consequence best avoided by a preventive cure. 
 
The cures of anger 
 
Due to its potentially destructive consequences for body, mind and society, anger needs to be 
treated, but the suggested cures differ according to the outlook and temperament of the 
therapist. We have seen that anger is both a medical and a moral condition, it is as much a 
fever as an evil or selfish passion. As such, it is a vice for which the agent is to be held 
responsible, and consequently he loses our sympathy. ‘Sudden passionate motions of anger’ 
are listed in Hutcheson’s System of Moral Philosophy as middle-range vices, less vicious than 
original malice, impiety or selfish design, but more vicious than partiality, or weakness when 
facing temptations or threats.64 Therefore it is immoral to cure acute anger by unleashing it for 
taking revenge, and it is also psychologically inadvisable because anger and revenge, as 
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Turnbull points out, ‘when their end is accomplished, what else is it but a short-lived 
relaxation from the most tormenting pain, which is quickly followed by remorse and just 
fears?’65 
 The suggested cures for anger also depend on the guise under which it is represented 
in various discourses, but one consensual way to avoid anger as a violent passion is 
preventive: one should have ‘well regulated affections’ which can save us from vice, the 
mind’s ‘greatest enemy, as well as debaser’ and which can keep ‘its health and peace’.66 Thus 
anger, considered as a psychological problem, can be prevented if we ‘strengthen as much as 
possible, by frequent Meditation and Reflection, the calm Desires’.67 An alternative route 
could lead through 
 
[t]he love of God, as it is the sovereign remedy of all miseries, so, in particular, it 
effectually prevents all the bodily disorders the passions introduce, by keeping the 
passions themselves within due bounds; and, by the unspeakable joy, and perfect calm, 
serenity and tranquility it gives the mind, becomes the most powerful of all the means 
of health and long life.68 
 
Preventing anger is the best way of avoiding all the unwelcome consequences of this 
condition, and it also has the side effect of strengthening the mind and body in general. 
 If prevention proves to be unsuccessful, then some rational reflection can help in acute 
cases, at least in Hutcheson’s understanding. Given that anger is a self-centred passion, it can 
be cured if one realises that it arises from a ‘partial View of publick Goods’, i.e. a biased 
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misrepresentation of intentions, actions and their consequences.69 If put in the proper light, it 
becomes apparent that anger typically arises from ‘ignorance or accident’:70 if we ‘force our 
Minds to examine the real Springs of the resented Actions’71 and contemplate our selfish 
passions by giving ‘just ideas of their objects’,72 we will find, more often than not, that the 
action giving rise to our anger is not due to malice but to ‘selfish Temper’ for which the 
author of the action is to be pitied rather than hated, as it is ‘really more pernicious to himself 
than to others’.73 Thus the reasons for? anger largely disappear if the action that gives rise to it 
is contemplated from a broader, moral point of view. 
 Mead is more interested in chronic and pathological cases for which he suggests both 
psychological and medical treatment. From the medical angle the task is to reduce increased 
circulation, because the right treatment requires the ‘disorderly motion of the animal spirits 
[…] to be calmed’. This can be achieved by blood-letting, blisters, setons or the cooling of the 
head, but in more severe cases taking medication like myrrh, galbanum, camphor or niter can 
also be suggested. As for its psychological treatment, Mead suggests not to investigate the 
causes of anger, quite the contrary: the patient should turn his attention to ‘thoughts directly 
contrary to those, which possessed it [i.e., the mind?] before’ in order to bring his mind out of 
the state it was in before.74  
 The emphasis in all these suggestions falls on therapies and techniques that could 
foster a physiological and affective equilibrium in individuals that live in a social world of 
conflicting interests and aspirations that provides ample occasions for anger. Coleman’s point 
about the enlightenment debates on anger on the Continent can be driven home in the Scottish 
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context as well: these theories directly relate to practical issues about the range of behaviours 
that are compatible with a cohesive society, about how people respond to one another, and 
how they understand themselves.75 The therapies that facilitate the maintenance of a 
harmonious inner world serve the purpose of peaceful and virtuous social coexistence. From 
this perspective, physiological, psychological and sociological diagnoses are subservient to, 
and are unified with, moral, social and sometimes religious agendas. 
 
Anger as natural and virtuous 
 
It is precisely the awareness of the social and religious significance of anger that eventually 
leads to a more balanced account of the phenomenon in several authors. Despite the 
overwhelming negative rhetoric of anger as a disease, mental disorder, vice and threat to the 
sociability of mankind, the very same authors are frequently sensitive to the function of anger 
in society and in God’s creation. 
In his Treatise of Human Nature, David Hume discusses anger as a natural ingredient 
of human affective constitution. He is not concerned with an evaluative account of anger as a 
vice or as a threat to society; instead he provides a naturalistic and phenomenological account 
of how anger is related to other passions, what role it plays in the motivation of action, and 
what its functions are in the context of human coexistence. For Hume, moderate anger is a 
normal and necessary constituent of our moral constitution: 
 
We are not, however, to imagine, that all the angry passions are vicious, tho’ they are 
disagreeable. There is a certain indulgence due to human nature in this respect. Anger 
and hatred are passions inherent in our very frame and constitution. The want of them, 
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on some occasions, may even be a proof of weakness and imbecility. And where they 
appear only in a low degree, we not only excuse them because they are natural; but 
even bestow our applauses on them, because they are inferior to what appears in the 
greatest part of mankind.76  
 
Maybe because Hume primarily aspires to a naturalistic theory, and he has no normative 
moral commitments that precede his descriptive account of human nature,77 he refrains from a 
condemning tone on anger. As a consequence, he does not see a problem with communicating 
anger, just like any other passion, via sympathy: unlike for Kames and Smith, anger for Hume 
is a passion whose communication ‘takes place among animals, no less than among men’.78 
 Hume is not alone with this insight: Hutcheson and Turnbull are even more detailed in 
explaining the positive role anger plays in the context of human sociability. The core idea, as 
Hutcheson puts it, is that ‘[o]ur Anger itself is a necessary Piece of Management, by which 
every pernicious Attempt is made dangerous to its Author.’79 This idea is also implicit in the 
passage from Hume quoted above, but Turnbull explains it in great detail in terms of its 
teleological, one could almost say: evolutionary, function. For him anger is a useful ‘instinct’ 
that is ‘in reality the necessary operation of self-defence’. Anger in its primary form is 
‘momentary’, it is a reaction against ‘natural evil’ or someone’s intention to harming us. As 
such it operates without reason, and it should be so because without government there is no 
time to deliberate when ‘sudden resistance is the only security’.80 
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 Reason itself can give rise to a different kind of anger when contemplating injustice. 
This kind of anger is a reaction to ‘moral evil’, and in this sense it has ‘an inseparable 
connexion with the sense of virtue’, because it is a desire of having the vice punished – and it 
is, as Turnbull warns us, is ‘by no means malice’. In this sense anger is not at all a threat to 
society, quite the contrary: ‘it is one of the common bonds by which society is held together: 
a fellow-feeling which each individual has in behalf of the whole species, as well as of 
himself.’81 This moral anger is however weaker than the natural because the latter is induced 
by harm intended towards ourselves, and our regard for ourselves are much greater than our 
regard for society or mankind. 
Thus anger for Turnbull is a phenomenon with many faces. It is true that it is a 
medical and psychological condition, a fever that corrupts the mind, and it is also an evil 
passion that must be constrained, but at the same time, it is a natural means of self defence 
under the relevant social circumstances (i.e. without central government), and in its higher 
form can even be genuinely moral – and taken as such it is a genuine virtue and not a vice. 
Moral anger, however, is not a selfish passion, it arises from the violation of public good, and 
its aim is not taking revenge but due punishment. 
Although Turnbull’s account is evolutionary in the sense that it explains why and how 
anger is necessary for survival and the moral stability of society, it is thought to function 
under the auspices of divine providence. Turnbull alludes to God’s design by emphasizing 
that there is a ‘reason and end’ for which ‘men was made liable to this passion’, namely ‘to 
prevent and remedy […] injury’.82 For Hutcheson, too, anger is part of human nature due to 
divine contrivance, and as such it responds to the needs of living in a society of conflicting 
interests arising from the self-love of individuals. Under such circumstances ‘[t]here could not 
[…] be a wiser contrivance to refrain injuries than to make every mortal some way formidable 
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to an unjust invader, by such a violent passion.’83 Anger has thus found a way from the 




Anger is a phenomenon that travelled back and forth between various discourses on human 
nature in the Scottish Enlightenment. As Thomas Dixon have pointed out, the concepts and 
categories of these discourses, in our case ‘passions’, ‘affections’, ‘self-love’ and so on, are 
common currencies of physiology, moral philosophy and theology.84 Due to the common 
conceptual resources, these disciplines not only studied the same phenomena, but they 
discussed them in the same language, and as a consequence they drove toward a unified 
account. Thus anger is a ranging fever, but as such it was not only a physiological and 
psychological phenomenon, but it also had moral significance as a violent passion, which 
quickly turned into a vice disagreeable to God and society. 
Cheyne is perhaps an ideal example of integrating all these aspects in a single account: 
he conceives of anger as an acute disease, avoiding it is a moral obligation, a duty toward 
ourselves, and the love of God is its best preventive cure. But even those not dwelling on all 
aspects of anger are aware of the various contexts in which the same language is applied. 
Turnbull, for one, seems to be equally well versed in the physiological, psychological, moral 
and religious discourses of anger, and paints a fairly balanced picture of it, albeit hardly 
discussing its physiological facets. But the same language is spoken by those not especially 
sensitive to the moral and religious implications of physiological processes, like Cullen. 
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Anger is thus a phenomenon through which a remarkable conceptual unity among 
early modern disciplines of human functioning can be illustrated. Due to this unity various 
aspects of human functioning had been represented as aspects of an organized unity. One 
consequence of this representation was the increasing tendency of naturalizing the spiritual, 
moral and psychological aspects of human beings by showing the physiological correlate of 
these aspects. For most authors the point of this naturalization was driven home in the context 
of Newtonian natural theology: by exploring the various aspects of the human frame and their 
interconnections the design and intentions of God could be explored. Mead illustrates this 
stance clearly; he thinks that his naturalizing project should not erode belief in divine power, 
as it is not less ‘manifested by the cure of the most grievous diseases, performed in an instant 
at his command; than by the expulsion of evil spirits’. Restoring ‘firmness and flexibility to 
relaxed and contracted nerves’ or ‘changing the properties of the elements’ testify both God’s 
omnipotence and presence in the world. 85  
At the same time, the continuity of these discourses also provided an inspiration in the 
opposite direction, namely that of secularisation. In the present context, Hume and Cullen are 
interested in naturalisation without aspiring for religious consequences. Hume made explicit 
the epistemological reasons of his refusal to extend the conclusions of either moral or natural 
philosophy to implications on transcendent matters: our cognitive apparatus is so limited that 
we cannot expect epistemic benefits from such inquiries.86 Hume’s ideas influenced Cullen’s 
methodology and metaphysics for chemistry and physiology, and as a possible consequence 
he also refrained from drawing moral or religious conclusions from natural inquiry.87 This 
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reluctance is reflected in the telling irony in his explorations of the possible causes and 
treatments of gout. Although Cullen also mentions the ‘passions of the mind’ among the 
occasional causes of gout, he refuses to speculate on possible therapies in this case, because 
‘[h]ow they are to be avoided I must leave to the philosophers, or, if you will, to the 
divines.’88  
Hume sees the role of his descriptive anatomy of human nature quite distinct from that 
of the normative discourse of the moralist, and Cullen similarly, but in a more reserved tone, 
separates his physiology from the questions of normative ethics and theology. Thus despite 
the language they share with those forging a common framework for human phenomena from 
natural philosophy to theology, Hume and Cullen turn away from normative and religious 
connotations of the study of human phenomena. By distancing the discourses of anger and 
other passions from theological considerations, they implicitly challenged the foundations of 
conceptual unity. Thus beside the conceptual unity of the discourses of anger, the tendencies 
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